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Double Learning or Double Blinding 
-An investigation of vendor private information acquisition and consumer learning via online 
reviews 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, building upon information acquisition theory and using portfolio methods and 
system equations, we made an empirical investigation into how online vendors and consumers are 
learning from each other, and how online reviews, prices, and sales interact among each other. First, this 
study shows that vendors acquire information from both private and public channels to learn the quality of 
their products to make price adjustment. Second, for the more popular products and newly released 
products, vendors are more motivated to acquire private information that is more precise than the average 
precision to adjust their price. Third, we document a full demand-mediation model between rating and 
price. In other words, there is no direct linkage between price and rating, and the impact of rating on price 
(the vendor learning) as well as the impact of price on rating (the consumer learning) are all through 
demand.  Our results show that there is no fundamental difference between the pricing decisions with and 
without the consumer generated contents. The price is still driven by the supply and demand relationship 
and vendors only adjust their price in response to review change when those reviews impact sales. We 
proposed either the impact of reviews has been incorporated into sales or reviews are less truth worthy 
due to potential review manipulation. Given the complicate situation, we call for further study to unveil 
this double learning process with double blinding results. 
 
Keywords:  online reviews, word-of-mouth, online product reviews, double-learning, analyst forecast 
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1. Introduction 
Pricing has been a long-standing topic among various research communities, such as economics, 
information systems, and marketing. Previous research has studied different aspects of online price, such 
as comparing the pricing level, pricing change frequency, pricing change amount of the online channels to 
those of the off-line channels (Amrouche and Yan, 2015). However, these researches treat price 
adjustment as a black-box without a fully understanding of how firms make price adjustment decision 
based on information from Internet.  
As one of the most exciting trends in computing today, consumer generated social media, holds 
the potential to change how information is accessed and presented, how knowledge is processed and 
extracted, how daily operation is conducted and how strategies are executed, and how pricing is 
determined and adjusted (Gu and Ye, 2014; Liu et al., 2015). As online reviews increasingly affecting the 
ecommerce demand, transforming the nature of the competition, and alternating the processes by which 
firms’ pricing decisions are made and implemented, it is timely and importantly to have a substantial 
understand of firm pricing decision with the presence of user generated contents-online reviews.  
The idea of better serving customer needs is rooted in the age-old notion of listening to the 
customer to co-create products and services. It is widely recognized today that companies that can better 
understand their customers’ needs will thrive in the competitive landscape (Jiang and Zhou, 2014). This 
requires companies to digest the richness quality and valuation information from today’s online consumer 
generated media and make the right pricing decision (Ngai et al., 2015). We argue that it is crucial and 
timely to develop a systematic framework to study the learning behavior of the consumer and vendor 
simultaneously.  
Till now, most of these studies only consider one side of the learning equation, i.e. only 
consumers learn quality information embedded inside online reviews. For example, there is an emerging 
literature studying whether consumers read, appreciate, and use the quality information embedded inside 
online reviews and respond accordingly-termed consumer learning effect. To document this consumer 
learning effect, a variety of regression models have been used to link online product reviews with product 
4 
sales (e.g., Chen et al. 2004, Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006, Dellarocas et al. 2004, Godes and Mayzlin 
2004, Hu et al. 2008, Li and Hitt 2008). The positive relation between the average (mean) score of these 
reviews and product sales revealed that consumers do act upon online reviews to make purchase decision.  
An implicit assumption in the extant research is that vendors ignore the rich semantic contents of 
online consumer reviews and does not adjust their price accordingly. To better serve their customers’ 
needs, rational vendors should not ignore the rich quality information embedded in online reviews. Before 
releasing a product to online market, vendors might only have some rough idea about the value or quality 
of that product through their initial market research such as consumer surveys, focus group study, or price 
of similar products.  They do not know the exact price number that they should charge in order to 
maximize their profit. To get started, under such a circumstance and for such a product, vendors will 
charge a price that reflects their belief of consumers’ valuation on that product at that moment. Then they 
might revise their assessment through observing the demand they received or the reviews posted by the 
consumers who bought and used that product. Through such a learning process, vendors can get a better 
valuation estimation of their product. In other words, vendors might adjust their product price in 
responding to the change of the sales or change of the online consumer reviews, which we term vendor 
learning effect.  The learning loop does not stop here. Consumers might (re)learn the product’s quality 
based on the price adjustment made by online vendors to change their perceived quality, make further 
purchase decision, and write a better consumer review, which we refer as consumer learning.  
Given the increasing importance of online user generated contents, it is timely and vital to put 
both sides of the learning equations together to understand how vendors and consumers are learning from 
each other to derive quality information from online reviews to make purchase or pricing decision. 
Therefore, our research questions are as follows: 
1. Are online reviews value-relevant to online vendors? In other words, are vendors also learning 
from online reviews?  
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2. What kind vendors are more motivated to acquire private information with higher precision to 
learn the quality information of a product?  
3. How are online vendors learning quality information from online reviews to make price 
adjustment? Do they adjust their price based on review change or they only respond to the 
demand change? 
4. Can vendors influence the online reviews by change price? Are consumers influenced by the 
pricing movement made by online vendors? Do prices drive ratings, and/or vice versa? Are rating 
change and price change concordant with each other? 
Based on the secondary data collected at Amazon.com from August 2005 to February 2006, our 
empirical evidence indicates that vendors do read and are acting upon online reviews to make price 
adjustment decision in order to increase their revenue. Therefore, our findings provide great insights on 
how vendors mange their customer relationship and product marketing and pricing strategies. 
The paper makes five key contributions: First, we show that vendors and consumers are learning 
from each other to make their pricing or purchase decisions simultaneously. The vendor side learning and 
the consumers’ learning from the vendor’s learning have been ignored by previous research. Based on 
system equations, we are able to unveil the simultaneous consumer and vendor learning effect. Second, 
we demonstrate that Amazon market behaves like a stock market. In this market, online reviews serve a 
role similar to public announcements. And vendors acquire information from both private and public 
channels to learn the quality of their products to make price adjustment decisions. Third, we document 
what kind vendors are more likely to engage on private information acquisition. For the more popular 
products and products newly released to Amazon market, vendors are more motivated to acquire private 
information that is more precise than the average precision to adjust their price. Fourth, we illustrate that 
the fundamental supply and demand relationship is still the main driver for online price. Vendors only 
adjust their price in response to the sales change instead of review change. Our interpretation is that either 
the impact of reviews have been incorporated into sales, or for vendors online reviews might be a noisy 
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signal because online reviews might be written by the authors, vendors’ competitors, or publishers instead 
of the actual customers. Thus unless online reviews really impact sales, vendors will not make the 
necessary price adjustment accordingly. Last, we demonstrate that the consumers are smart as well and do 
not change their rating in response to the price adjustment made by vendors. To conclude, we document a 
full demand-mediation model between rating and price. In other words, there is no direct linkage between 
price and rating, and the impact of rating on price (the vendor learning) as well as the impact of price on 
rating (the consumer learning) are all through demand.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we study the information contents of 
online reviews. We compare the difference between Amazon market and stock market to build our 
theoretical framework and research hypotheses to study whether vendors acquire information from both 
public and private channels in response to online consumer reviews.  Using system equation, Section 3 
addresses the issue how vendors and consumers are learning from each other and how vendors make 
pricing adjustment decision.  Section 4 discusses the limitations and concludes with suggestions for future 
research. 
 
2. Are Firms Acquiring both Public and Private Information in Response to Online Reviews?  
2.1 Backgrounds and Hypotheses 
The Internet has fundamentally changed the competition environment of firms, offering business and 
consumers an increasingly powerful channel to acquire product quality, price, and demand information. 
With the fast adoption of web 2.0 driven user communities and the prevalent implementation of online 
reviews, a large number of consumers resorting to use these consumer generated media to voice their 
opinions on the products they have purchased (Gaikar et al., 2015). Marketing power is no longer 
restricted to a local context, but can reach anyone connected through the Internet. Given the enormous 
real-time product quality information vendors can extract from online consumer reviews, this might lead 
to a more dramatic price competition as well as a faster price adjustment. With menu costs previously 
preventing rapid price from happening getting eliminated, and with the delay of receiving users feedbacks 
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getting removed, vendors might be able to make instantaneous price adjustment in response to the real-
time new feedbacks, such as online reviews. However, is that true? 
Previous studies have studied different aspects of Internet pricing, such as the absolute price level, 
price adjustment frequency, price adjustment amount of online versus those of offline, to answer whether 
Internet might lead to a more dramatic price competition and higher price rigidity. On the price level side, 
several empirical studies have compared the price levels between conventional offline firms and online 
firms. However, the results are inconclusive. Some researchers concluded that on average, firms selling 
through online market might be able to charge a higher price comparing to the offline market (Cortese 
and Stepaneck 1998, Erevelles et al. 2001). However, others claimed the opposite (Ancarani and Shankar 
2002, Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000, Morton et al. 2001). For example, by comparing the prices of books, 
CDs, and software sold on the Internet to those on conventional offline channels in 1996 and 1997, Bailey 
(1998) concluded that on average vendors charged higher prices in online channels for each product 
category. His interpretation is the value adding service provided by online channels, such as convenience, 
leads to a higher price. However, by examining prices for books and CDs sold through the Internet and 
conventional channels in a later period (1998 and 1999), Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) found that the 
Internet had lower unit prices because the online market had become more efficient. Morton et al (2001) 
reached a similar conclusion by analyzing the online automobiles price versus offline dealer price.  
On the price rigidity side, Bergen et al. (2005) studied the Internet price rigidity using data of 377 
books collected from the Amazon.com and Barnes and Noble. They documented that on average, there 
was much less frequent price adjustment on these websites and the price-change activities varied across 
product categories. Based on the price of CD titles, Lee et al. (2003) found that the price adjustment of 
Internet retailers was much smaller than offline counterparts; and the price dispersion of Internet retailers 
was also lower than that of offline retail stores. However, to my best knowledge, all these researches treat 
price change as a black-box without fully understanding how vendors really make such a decision. For 
this study, we open this black-box by investigating how vendors use both public and private information 
to make price adjustment decision. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) believe that pricing is likely to be 
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frictionless on the Internet. If that is the case, it suggests that applying pricing models that are financial-
market-like provides the functionality of the stock markets in firms’ ability to adjust prices (Bergen et al., 
2005).  
So does online review market really behalf as a stock market? What is the difference and 
similarity between stock market and Amazon market? If we treat online market as stock market, online 
consumer reviews as public information announcements, such as earning announcements, analyst 
forecasts or forecast revision, then we should expect that both customers and vendors to use the quality 
information embedded inside the online reviews to make their own decisions. Table 1 compares the 
learning process of stock market to online review market. For the investors of stock market, their goal is 
to identify the intrinsic value of a stock using both public available information (such as earning 
announcement) and/or private information (such as inside news); while for the vendors of online review 
market, their goal is to identify the intrinsic value of an item and decide whether to change the price or 
not based on both publicly available information (such as online reviews) and/or private information 
(such as focus group study or survey). So both entities have information acquisition needs. And both 
parties go through learning processes using information coming from various channels. 
Table : 1 Learning Process Comparison Between Amazon Market and Stock Market 
 Stock Market Consumer on 
Amazon.com 
Vendor on Amazon.com 
Goal Identify the intrinsic value of a 
stock ,and decide whether to buy 
or to sell that stock based 
Identify the intrinsic quality 
of an item and decides 
whether to buy that item. 
To identify the intrinsic price of 
an item, a vendor setups an 
initial price and see how the 
market responds to his product 
to decide whether to change the 
price and how much 
Information 
Source 
Public (earning announcement, 
analyst forecast etc) or private 
information (e.g. inside  
information) 
Public (e.g. online reviews) 
or private information (e.g. 
friends’ opinion) 
Public (e.g. online reviews) or 
private information (e.g. focus 
group study) 
Participants Multiple buyers and sellers of 
heterogeneous valuation 
Multiple buyers with 
heterogeneous tastes and 
quality valuation 
Multiple vendors selling 
products with heterogeneous 
quality valuation 
Procedures 1. Consumers acquire public 
information, such as balance 
sheet,  income statement, and 
1.Consumers read public 
information, such as author, 
publishers, subject, the return 
1.Vendors read public 
information, such as online 
reviews to determine the 
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cash flow statement to form their 
valuation of one particular stock. 
2. Consumers acquire private 
information to fine turn their 
evaluation 
3. Compare the current stock 
price to the estimated to make 
buy/sell decision. 
 
policy, product warrant, 
online reviews, etc to 
determine the quality of a 
product 
2. Consumers acquire private 
information (such as seeking 
friends’ opinions) to adjust 
their evaluation. 
3. Put all the information 
together and form an intrinsic 
quality or value independent 
of the current sale price. 
quality of a product 
2. Vendors collect private 
information, such as focus 
group interview to turn their 
evaluation, 
3. Put all the information 
together and decide whether to 
change price or not, and how 
much to change. 
Driving 
Forces 
New information Pricing change and consumer 
rating change to decide 
whether to buy or not. 
Sales change and review 
change to decide whether to 
change price 
How to test 
private 
information 
acquisition 
Trading volume associated with 
absolute price change reflects 
pre-announcement private 
information and trading volume 
independent of absolute price 
change reflects event-period 
private information 
 Absolute price change 
associated  absolute rating 
(sales) change reflects pre-
announcement private 
information and absolute price 
change independent of absolute 
rating sales) change reflects 
event-period private 
information 
 
Conceptually, in this study, we treat an online store with online reviews as a stock market and 
individual items in this online store as equivalent of individual stocks. When facing pre-existing public 
information and upcoming announcements, there are deep learning effects driven by information needs on 
both markets. On the stock market, in response to a public news announcement, such as an appointment 
of new CEO, individual investors might actively acquire private information, such as talking to friends in 
that company to find more information about this CEO. Through this information acquisition process, 
they can better assess the driver for this new movement, resulting in an adjusted intrinsic valuation about 
that stock; While, for the vendors on the Amazon market, they are actively learning from both public and 
private information channels to make price adjustment decision in response to online review 
“announcements” as well. For example, when facing a decreasing consumer rating for its online products, 
vendors should not immediately conclude that they are charging a higher price, thus make an immediately 
price adjustment. They might conduct survey to find the really underlying reason. Combining these 
private information with the rating change or sales change information, vendors can make the final 
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decision about the direction and the magnitude of the change. While on consumer learning side, the price 
vendors charged, the price adjustment (direction and magnitude) vendors made, and the online reviews 
left by previous customers all have the potential to change consumers’ intrinsic value of a product as well. 
Next, we focus on studying the vendor side learning by comparing the information acquisition effect on 
the online review market and stock market to build our theory foundations (Figure 1).  
===========Insert Figure 1 here============ 
Fig 1 Information Acquisition Effect on Stock Market and Amazon Market 
As Figure 1 points out, on stock market, besides public information channel, investors can 
acquire stock valuation information through private information channel to help them to determine the 
intrinsic value of a stock; while on online review market, when facing review and sales information, 
vendors can also acquire private information to determine whether and how much they need to make price 
change. On stock market, the main reason for acquiring private information is that for the same 
announcement (public information), the better informed investors (those acquire private information with 
higher precise than the average precision) economically will benefit more than less informed investors 
(Kim and Verrecchia 1997). However, given there is a cost for private information acquisition, investors 
of big firms or firms with higher percentage of institutional ownership will be more likely to engage on 
private information acquisition (Schneible and Stevens 2005) because the return to private information 
increases with firm size (Atiase 1980) and institutional ownership.  
Following a similar line of argument, we propose that on Amazon market, to better serve their 
customers, vendors need to make the price adjustment based on the public information, such as the review 
posts, the rating change, or the sales (demand) changei, or the private information, such as results from 
focus group study. In this paper, we use sales rank instead of sales because Amazon does not provide the actual 
sales number. For sales rank, that information is public available.   This approach is consistent with similar previous 
researches such as Nan et al. (2008), Shen et al. (2015) and Chong et al. (2016).  However, for the same 
magnitude of rating or sale change, the pricing adjust level might vary across vendors due to the different 
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level of private information vendors holding. The main reason for acquiring private information in 
Amazon is also due to economic consequence. In Amazon, for the same level of announcement (e.g. same 
magnitude of rating score change or sales change), the better informed vendors economically will benefit 
more than less informed vendors because they can adjust price to a better level that suits their customer 
needs. Private information here can mean conducting focus group study, sending survey to customers, or 
getting professional consulting group involvement to have a more accurate picture about customers’ 
valuation of their product.  However, just as in the stock market, the private information acquisition for 
these online vendors is not free. We hypothesize that since there is a cost for private information 
acquisition, vendors selling more popular items or newly released items have a higher incentive to engage 
on private information acquisition (Figure 2).   
============Insert Figure 2 here============ 
Fig 2 Time Learning Effect and Popularity Learning Effect 
Popularity Learning Effect and Time Learning Effect 
The X-axis of Figure 2 represents the time learning effect, while the Y-axis shows the popularity 
learning effect. As we can see, for different items, vendors have higher incentive to engage in private 
information acquisition for popular items because economic wise, they can benefit more from such 
learning. As for the time driven learning effect, as items change from just getting released to Amazon 
market to the stage that they become an aged item, the available public information as well as the 
informativeness of these public information keeps increasing, thus vendors will have less incentive to 
acquire private information for aged items.  
Pre-announcement and within Event Period Private Information Acquisition 
Investors can acquire private information both before a public announcement and within 
announcement period. Analytically Kim and Verrecchia (1997) show that trading volume associated with 
absolute price change reveals pre-announcement private information acquisition; while trading volume 
independent of absolute price change reflects the private information acquisition within event period. And 
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with the increase in the private information acquisition, the volume reaction associated with or 
independent of absolute price change will increase as well (Kim and Verrecchia 1991 and 1994). 
 Follow the same argument, we proposal that on the online environments, facing the online 
review “announcements”, vendors will acquire private information before and within announcement 
period as well. Before announcement meaning before new online reviews come or before putting a 
product to market, vendors might conduct private market researches, focus group, etc to better access the 
market demand and valuation of the products they are selling. Within announcement measures after 
reading new online reviews, vendors might change their belief. To further validate that, they might 
conduct private market research to decide whether to make the necessary price adjustment.  
And cross-sectional the pre-announcement and within-event period private information 
acquisition vary across vendors. Across different vendors, those selling more popular items are more 
motivated to acquire private information; and for the same item across time horizon, at the early stage 
right after a product gets released to the market, vendors are more motivated to acquire private 
information as well. Such different level private information acquisition will manifest through the relation 
between absolute price changes and absolute review change (or absolute sales change) (Figure 1). In other 
words, both the magnitude of rating change and sales change across different periods might serve as the 
signal of the consumer valuation change. Assume that there are two groups of vendors; the first group 
sells very popular items; while the second group sells very un-popular items. Because the vendors in the 
first group selling more popular items are more motivated to acquire more private information above 
normal precision, thus holding other information the same, the variance of the information holding across 
the vendors in the first group definitely is higher than that of the second group. Thus, we should observe a 
bigger magnitude of price movement in the first group than in the same group. 
Besides private information acquisition, the precision of the pre-announcement public 
information also impact the market volume response. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) proposes that an 
increase on the precision of the pre-announcement public information will decrease the volume reaction 
independent of absolute price change; while at the same time it has no impact on the volume reaction 
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associated with absolute price change Kim and Verrecchia (1991b). We proposal this will hold for the 
relation between absolute price change and absolute rating (sales) change on the online review market as 
well. Furthermore, previous study on the price rigidity proposes that most vendors keep their price 
position after a 3-month period; however, they are more likely to change their price as time elapses (Oh 
and Lucas, 2006).  
 
Table 2A: Relations between Absolute Price Change and Popularity Effect 
Item Absolute Price Change 
Associated with Absolute Rating 
(Sales) change 
Absolute Price Change 
Independent of Absolute Rating 
(Sales) change 
Less popularity (More Silence) item, less 
private information acquisition 
_ _ 
Decrease in the pre-announcement public 
information precision 
No Effect + 
Price rigidity With time elapsed, it is more likely to have price change (+) 
 
 Table 2B: Relations between Absolute Price Change and Age Effect 
Item Absolute Price Change 
Associated with Absolute Rating 
(Sales) change 
Absolute Price Change 
Independent of Absolute Rating 
(Sales) change 
More aged item, less private information 
acquisition 
_ _ 
Increase in the pre-announcement public 
information precision 
No Effect _ 
Price rigidity With time elapsed, it is more likely to have price change (+) 
 
Table 2A and Table 2B summarize the different forces having impact on the price movement in 
response to absolute rating (sales) change on Amazon market, including private information acquisition, 
public information precision, and price rigidity. Given the same level of information (the magnitude of 
sales change or rating change) vendors received, different vendors might respond with different 
magnitudes of price adjustment due to the private information they are holding or the precision of the 
public information. As we can see, that for time related learning effect, with items become aged, the 
private information acquisition between events and the pre-announcement public information precision 
work toward the same direction on the absolute price reaction independent with absolute rating (review) 
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change. For the popularity related learning effect, on the absolute price reaction independent with 
absolute rating (review) change, with items become less popular, the private information acquisition 
between events works toward different direction from the pre-announcement public information precision. 
However, due to the price rigidity, for both time driven and popular driven learning, the ultimate direction 
of the absolute price reaction independent of absolute rating (review) change depends on the relative 
magnitude among private information acquisition effect, the public information effect, and the price 
rigidity.  And the ultimate sign of the absolute price reaction associated with absolute rating (review) 
change depends on the relative magnitude between private information acquisition effect and precision of 
the public information. 
We expect that the public information of the more popular items or more aged item to be more 
precise than that of the less popular items or newly released item. Assuming that review change or sales 
change do have information contents, we have the following hypotheses:  
 
 
H1: Absolute price adjustment associated with absolute sales (or rating) change decreases with 
item age if the return to private information effect dominates and increases with item age if the 
price rigidity effect dominates. 
 
H2: Absolute price adjustment independent of absolute sales (or rating) change decreases with 
item age if the net results of the return to private information effect and the precision of public 
(pre-announcement) information effect dominates and increases if the price rigidity effect 
dominates. 
 
H3: Absolute price adjustment associated with absolute sales (or rating) change decreases with 
item popular decreases if the return to private information effect dominates and increases with 
item popular decreases if the price rigidity effect dominates. 
 
H4: Absolute price adjustment independent of absolute sales (or rating) change decreases with 
item popular decreases if the return to private information effect dominates and increases if the 
net results of the precision of public (pre-announcement) information effect and price rigidity 
effect dominates. 
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2.2 Empirical Regulation 
To test our hypotheses, we adopt the following regression model to link absolute price to absolute sales or 
rating change (as follows). Again, the magnitude of the absolute price or sales change sends signal to 
vendors about the market valuation, combining this with the level of the private information vendors hold, 
vendors will respond accordingly. 
 
   
   
i t
0 1 i t-1 2 i t-1 3 4i t-1 i t-1
5 i t-1 6 i t-1i t-1 i t-1
7
| LogPriceChg | =
α +α | LogSaleRankChg | +α | AvgRatingChg | +α Log Silence +α Log T
α | LogSaleRankChg | *Log Silence +α | AvgRatingChg | *Log Silence
α | LogSaleRankChg    i t-1 8 i t-1 9 i i ti t-1 i t-1 | *Log T +α | AvgRatingChg | *Log T +α DvdDummy +ε
 Where 
= the absolute difference between the natural log of Sales Rank at time t i t| LogSaleRankChg |
and that at t-1 for the ith product 
| = the absolute difference between the natural log of price at time t and that at i t LogPriceChg |
t-1 for the ith product 
= Absolute rating change from t-1 to t for the ith product i t-1| AvgRatingChg |
= the natural log of the Silence variable of the ith product at time t, where i tLog Silence
, smaller value represents items with higher Silence=T/Number of Reviews  i tLog Silence
popularity. 
= How long the ith product has been released to Amazon market   i tLog T
 
 The coefficients on the variable and capture the between events private  Log T  Log Silence
information acquisition related to time driven learning and popularity driven learning. They are the results 
of the net effect among private information acquisition during the event period, the precision of the pre-
announcement information, and the price rigidity (Hypothesis 2 and 4). The coefficients on the interaction 
terms , ,   | AvgRatingChg |*Log Silence  | LogSaleRankChg |*Log Silence  | AvgRatingChg |*Log T
and capture the before event private information acquisition related to time  | LogSaleRankChg|*Log T
driven learning and popularity driven learning; they are the results of the trade-off between private 
information acquisition before public announcement and the price rigidity (Hypothesis 1 and 3). 
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2.3. Data Collection 
We collected our data from Amazon.com’s Web Service (AWS). These data allow us to examine the how 
consumers and vendors are learning from each other and how vendors adjust price based on both public 
and private information. A panel of books and DVDs was randomly chosen in July 2005. We used panel 
data because compared with cross-sectional data, panel data are more suitable for studying the dynamics 
of adjustments because they control for unobserved heterogeneity (Baltagi 2001, Boulding 1990). For 
each item, we collected its price, sales, and review information for several months at approximately three-
day intervals. We identified each session by a unique sequence number. Because of some technical 
glitches in AWS, we had to exclude certain sequences in which only partial data were collected. For 
example, during several sessions, AWS did not respond to our queries or was offline and we were 
therefore only able to process partial or no data during these sessions. In total, we obtained 26 batches of 
review and item-level data.  
Table 3 provides summary statistics for our panel data. The data include some very popular books, 
such as Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything by Steven D. Levitt; 
and popular DVDs, such as The Simpsons and Star Wars. On Amazon.com, consumers can only report an 
integer product review on a 1-star to 5-star scale, where 1-star = least satisfied and 5-star = most satisfied. 
The average review scores for books and DVDs, are 3.87 and 4.07 respectively.  Instead of providing the 
actual sales number, Amazon.com provides the sales rank information of the item. Product sales rank is 
shown in descending order where 1 represents the best selling product. Consequently, there is a negative 
correlation between product sales and sales rank. However, from information content prospective, the 
magnitude of the sales rank can be used as a proxy for the magnitude of product sales. Henceforth, unless 
stated differently, whenever we refer to change in sales, it represents a change in sales rank. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Amazon Data (July 2005 – Jan 2006) 
Category #Reviews #Amazon Items #Distinct Items Avg_Rating 
Book 6,759,764 261,187 10,052 3.87 
DVD 4,056,340 258,736 9,988 4.07 
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2.4 Results 
Table 4: Regression Result of the Private Information Acquisition Model 
Information Acquisition Model 
Dependent Variable  | LogPriceChg | t 
| LogSaleRankChg | t-1 0.0507 
  (1.59, 0.0561*) 
| AvgRatingChg | t-1 0.2467 
  (0.51, 0.3068) 
LogSilence t-1 0.0551 
  (1.85, 0.0324**) 
LogT t-1 -0.0111 
  (-0.62,0.2662) 
| LogSaleRankChg | t-1*LogSilence t-1 -0.0079 
  (-2.05, 0.0201**) 
| AvgRatingChg | t-1*LogSilence t-1 0.0815 
  (0.62, 0.2684 ) 
| LogSaleRankChg | t-1*LogT t-1 0.0080 
  (-3.63, 0.0002***) 
| AvgRatingChg | t-1*LogT t-1 -0.0288 
  (-0.27, 0.3922) 
Dvddummy -0.7708 
  (-23.81, <.0001***) 
N 16430 
R2 0.0755 
 
We estimated Model 1 using ordinary least square (OLS) and reported the results in Table 4.  It seems 
that absolute sales change has information content to vendors in terms of helping them make price 
adjustment, but not absolute rating change.  
The coefficient  before  is significant negative (Para=-0.0079 and  | LogSaleRankChg |*Log Silence
P-value=0.0201), indicating that vendors selling more popularity (less Silence) items are more likely to 
engage on pre-announcement private information gathering to make the price adjustment, and the private 
information acquisition before information release dominates the price rigidity (supporting hypothesis 3). 
If there is no pre-announcement private information acquisition before releasing online reviews, then the 
price rigidity effect will make the coefficient before  be positive.  | LogSaleRankChg |*Log Silence
While the positive coefficient before (Para=0.0551 and   P=0.0324) indicates that adding  Log Silence
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together, the precision of pre-announcement public information effect and the price rigidity effect, 
outperforms the private information acquisition within events (See table 2A).  
  According to table 2B, if there is no price rigidity and the precision of public information, the 
coefficients before and should all be negative with the increase on the  | LogSaleRankChg|*Log T  Log T
value of  because for the same items, the longer it stays on Amazon market, the less motivated a  Log T
vendor will engage on private information gathering to make the price adjustment. At the same, as time 
elapses, public information becomes more accurate and is more aligned toward the actual quality of a 
product. Thus, comparing to a newly released item, the same magnitude of review change or sales change 
for an aged item will be less informative because it includes less extra information, hence, resulting in a 
even smaller price movement.  However, due to the positive force exerted by price rigidity with elapsed 
time, the relation between Price change and Time becomes more complex. First, the coefficient before 
 is significant positive (Para=0.0080 and P-value=0.0002), indicating that the  | LogSaleRankChg|*Log T
price rigidity dominates the private information acquisition before announcement. Furthermore, the 
coefficient before  (Para=-0.0111 and   P=0.2622) is negative but not significant. This is because,  Log T
as time goes by, besides the negative private information acquisition effect, there is also the negative 
public information precision effect. The positive price rigidity can’t dominate the above two factors-the 
private information acquisition and the public information precision, resulting in an insignificant 
coefficient before  . To summarize, we document that absolute sales change is informative about  Log T
vendors’ price adjustment decision; however, absolute rating change has no information contents about 
vendors’ price movement. Furthermore it is more likely for vendors selling more popularity item to 
engage on pre-announcement private information acquisition.  
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3. Are consumers and vendors learning from each other-Portfolio Analysis? 
In previous section, we document whether vendors are learning from both public and private channels to 
make pricing adjustment decision, and what type of vendors are more likely to engage on private 
information acquisition. However, the above regression with un-signed variable can only show the 
information content of our variables, without being able to reveal exactly how vendors make price 
adjustment decision. Furthermore, as elaborated in our introduction, there are two sides of the learning 
equation: vendors (pricing decision) and consumers (purchasing and rating decision). We suspect that 
there is dynamic learning between these two groups. However, to get started, following the tradition, in 
section 3.1 we ignore such dynamic learning nature and estimate the consumer learning behavior and 
vendor learning behavior separately by assuming an uni-direction between rating and price, or price and 
rating (Figure 3). In section 3.2, we investigate this phenomenon using more sophisticated system 
equations to study the inter-dependent consumer learning and vendors learning simultaneously to check 
whether the results are different. 
============Insert Figure 3 here============ 
Fig 3 Uni-Relationship between Rating and Price 
3.1 Portfolio Analysis 
Before we present our system equation results, let’s first show some results based on portfolio analysis to 
enlighten whether consumers change their belief (rating) when vendors change their prices; and whether 
vendors change their price in response to consumers’ rating change. As Figure 3 illustrates, we separate 
these two learning process and measure them separately. Portfolio approach is commonly used in the 
accounting and finance literatures to study whether stock market participants understand information 
value of some phenomena. Hu et al. (2008) adopt a portfolio approach to assess the effectiveness of the 
online review market. They show that consumers understand the value difference between favorable news 
portfolio and unfavorable news portfolio and respond accordingly. The meaning of a portfolio in this 
context is different from a traditional finance context, where a portfolio represents a basket of securities, 
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typically designed to reduce risk. Here the portfolio comprises products and events (pricing increase 
versus price decrease; or rating increase versus rating decreasing) sharing similar characteristics.  
To document whether vendors adjust price based rating, we separate items and events into two 
groups: the rating increase and decrease group. The rating increase (decrease) group includes events 
where average consumer rating increase (decrease) from time t-2 to time t-1. Under such a circumstance, 
we investigate for these two groups of items, on average, from time t-1 to t, whether the rating increasing 
group enjoys a significant higher future price change (from t-1 to t) than the rating decreasing group 
(from t-1 to t). If that is indeed the case, we conclude that vendors do adjust their price in responding to 
rating change. 
To study whether consumers adjust their rating when vendors change their price, the consumer 
learning effect, those items whose price increases (decreases) from time t-2 to time t-1 are classified into 
the price increasing (decreasing) group. By comparing the future average rating change (from t-1 to t) of 
the price increasing group to that of the price decreasing group, we can document the existence of 
consumer learning.  
Table 5A presents the vendor learning results. It shows that for the items of rating decreasing 
portfolio, on average, in the future (from time t-1 to t), their prices decrease $0.018; while for the items of 
rating increase portfolio, on average, their prices increase $0.0102. However, the price change difference 
between these two groups are not significant (Para=-0.029 and P-Value=0.6772). It seems that to some 
degree that vendors do increase the price when the rating goes up, and decrease price while the rating 
goes down. However, statistically we cannot document that. Furthermore, to tease out the potential 
confounding influence of the popular of a product on the price movement, we classify our items into 4 
equal spaced groups based on product sales ranks at time t-1 and repeat the same analysis (Table 5A). 
Group 1 includes items with the least sales rank, thus the best sales. And it shows that regardless of the 
sales of the items, there is no significant future price change difference between the rating decrease group 
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and rating increase group. Thus based on portfolio method, it seems that vendors do not change price in 
response to rating. 
 
Table 5A: Given the Rating Change Check the Future Price Change 
Rating Decline Group  Rating Increase Group 
Group 
N Average  Price Change N 
Average  
Price Change 
Price Change 
Difference P-Value 
All 1615 -0.0180 1738 0.0102 -0.0290 0.6772 
1 383 -0.0050 455 0.0637 -0.0690 0.6293 
2 399 0.0016 439 -0.0040 0.0052 0.9804 
3 406 -0.1150 433 0.0008 -0.1160 0.1108 
4 427 0.0436 411 -0.0240 0.0677 0.3649 
 
Table 5B: Given the Price Change Check the Future Rating Change 
Price Decline Group Price Increase Group 
Group 
N Average  Rating Change N 
Average  
Rating Change 
Rating Change 
Difference P-Value 
All 7818 -0.0020 7859 -0.0010 -0.0005 0.6394 
1 1916 -0.0030 2003 -0.0010 -0.0010 0.5105 
2 1946 -0.0030 1973 -0.0010 -0.0020 0.5648 
3 2051 -0.0010 1869 -0.0030 0.0017 0.4733 
4 1905 -0.0010 2014 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.6047 
 
Table 5B presents the results of whether consumers adjust their rating in response to the price 
change with and without the popularity of items get controlled. Same as vendor side learning, comparing 
to the items received a increasing price from time t-2 to t-1, for items received a decreasing price within 
that period, on average, they do not enjoy a better future consumer rating (difference=-0.0005 P-
value=0.6394), failing to support the claim that consumers might give a better rating if vendors lower 
their price. We reach the same conclusion when we control the sales of the item as well (please refer to 
the results of group 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Table 5B for details) 
3.2 System Equation 
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Our simple portfolio analyses did not find evidences that vendors or consumer are learning from each 
other to make the price or rating decision. Is that really true? As we state before, due to the systematic, 
dynamic, and bi-direction nature of the vendor and consumer learning, estimating these two learning 
processes separately might not reveal the underlying learning processes because the price, reviews, and 
sales are jointly determined by each other. To address such an issue, we turn to system equation using 
limited information maximum likelihood estimation1.  
Figure 4 describes this dynamic learning pattern. At the first stage, vendors set up an initial price 
to start this game (Stage 1 in Figure 4), based on public information (such as price), private information, 
or online reviews (if available), consumers make purchase decision (stage 2). Based on the observed 
reviews, sales, or other private information, vendors make the necessary price adjustment (stage 3). The 
changing price might influence the sales at stage 4, henceforth, resulting in change of review at stage 5 
because the new price might attract a different segment of customers. Please be aware that the time t is in 
the relative sense.  
Figure 4 also shows that the direction between rating and price are bi-direction, and there are both 
direct and indirect impacts between these two variables. On the vendor learning side, rating might directly 
influence vendors pricing decision (direct impact); or rating might achieve that goal through the 
mediation of demand (indirect impact); On the consumer learning side, a decreasing price might either 
directly improves future consumer ratings (direct impact); or indirectly boosts consumer reviews through 
stimulating the demand (indirect impact) by bringing another segment of customers.  
============Insert Figure 4 here============ 
Fig 4 Double-Learning Research Model 
3.2.1 Empirical Regulation of Double Learning 
Equation 1: Vender Learning: 
 
1 This estimation is available through SYSLIN procedure in SAS. Qualitatively, the results do not change 
when we use 2SLS. 
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     
   0 1 2 3 i t-2i t i t-1 i t-14 5 6 i t-1 7 i i ti t-1 i t-1
Log Price = α +α Log SalesRank +α Log Price +α Avgrating
+α Log Silence +α Log T +α HelpRatio +α DvdDummy + 
Equation 2: Demand Function: 
 
     
   0 1 2 3 i t-2i t-1 i t-2 i t-24 5 6 i t-2 7 i i t-1i t-2 i t-2
Log SalesRank = + Log SalesRank + Log Price + Avgrating
+ Log Silence + Log T + HelpRatio + DvdDummy +
   
     
Equation 3: Consumer Learning: 
            
   
   i t 0 1 i t-1 2 3i t-1 i t-24 5 6 i t-1 7 i i ti t-1 i t-1
Avgrating = + Avgrating + Log SalesRank + Log Price
+ Log Silence + Log T + HelpRatio + DvdDummy +
   
     
Where 
= the natural log of sales rank for the ith product at time t.  i tLog SalesRank
= the natural log of price for the ith product at time t.  i tLog Price
=the average rating for the ith product at time t.  i tAvgrating
= the natural log of the Silence of the ith product at time t, where  i tLog Silence
, smaller value represents items with  higher Silence=T/Number of Reviews  i tLog Silence
popularity. 
= How long the ith product has been released to Amazon market at time t.  i tLog T
, this variable is used to measure out of all the N 
N N
i t j j
j=1 j=1
HelpRatio = Helpful_Vote / Total_Vote 
number of reviews item i received till time t, on average, how helpful are these reviews. 
 
We expect the signs of the estimated coefficients to be: 
 * <0 ( >0 and <0), indicating negative indirect price effect. When the vender charges a 2β 2γ 2β 2γ
lower price, the demand of this product increase (Sales rank declines). And the lower price 
attracts a new segment of customers, resulting in a lower review rating.  
 * >0 ( <0 and <0), indicating positive indirect Rating effect. When the consumers give 3 1α 3 1α
higher rating, the good reviews will lead to a higher demand (Sales rank becomes smaller), and 
then this will encourage the vender charge a higher price to maximize its profit. 
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 >=0 (Direct rating effect) When >0 measures the directly impact of rating to vendors’ 3α 3α
pricing adjustment decision. It reveals the venders learning effect, that is, vendors directly 
respond to consumers’ reviews to adjust their price. But if the venders think the Average Rating 
might be manipulated, they will make their pricing adjustment decision based on the demand 
(Sales Rank). Under such a circumstance, =0 3α
 <=0 (Direct pricing effect). When <0 means consumers will change their evaluation 3 3
according to the Price. It reflects that consumers directly respond to vendors’ price adjustment 
movement to change their online reviews.  But if consumers are smart, they will not change their 
rating in response to vendors’ price adjustment, hence =0. Under such a circumstance, the 3
price only impact rating through demand.  
 
In order to test the significance of the indirect price and rating effects through the demand (Sales 
Rank), we calculated the t-value according to Sobel (1982). For example, to test the indirect price effect, 
we estimate the t as (where  is the standard error of the estimated  
2 1
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 β 1 ββ *γ / β * β *S S 22βS
coefficient). 
3.2.2 Empirical Results  
Table 6 presents the limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation of our double learning 
model. Asymptotically two stage least square (2SLS) and LIML estimators had the same distribution 
(Anderson 2005). Even though it is much easier to compute the 2SLS , LIML was considered to be 
advantageous than 2SLS due to the following three reasons: 
1) The parameter estimation method of simultaneous equation models was based on using maximum     
likelihood. And it is commonly believed that the maximum likelihood method yields superior     
estimators (Anderson 2005);  
2) LIML takes into account of the covariances of the errors; 
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3) 2SLS estimator treats the components of β asymmetrically and that was contrary to the point of view 
of  simultaneous equations (Page 9 Anderson 2005). 
 We estimate the system equation using Proc Syslin and present the results in Table 6.  We 
obtained the condition index to detect the existence of multicollinearity and found that our conditional 
index is smaller than 15, thus we conclude for our data, multicollinearity is not a serious concern here. 
Furthermore, we check serial correlation with DW test. Since our DW value is 1.405, we can also reject 
the existence of serial correlation. 
For the vendor side learning (the price equation), the direct impact of online reviews on sales is 
not significant (Para=0.0000 and P-value=0.9622), indicating that vendors do not adjust their price by 
simply responding to the review change. is significant negative (Para=-0.0380 and P-value<=0.0001), 3β
while is also significant negative (Para=-0.0095 and P-value<=0.0001). Combining them together, 1 3
* is significant positive (Para=0.0004 and P-value<=0.10), indicating that rating only indirectly impact 1α
vendors’ pricing decision through sales (Figure 5).  For the consumer side learning (Rating Equation in 
Table 6), we reach a similar conclusion that pricing only indirectly impacts consumer reviews through 
sales because 1) (direct impact) is not significant different from zero(Para=-0.0016 and P-3
value=0.4867); 2) is significant positive (Para=0.0139 and P-value=0.0943) and is significant 2 2
negative (Para=-0.0417 and P-value<=0.01); and 3) is significant negative (Para=0.0006 and P-2 2* 
value<=0.01). Figure 5 summarizes the results for our double-learning model. As we can see, this is a full 
demand-mediation model because the impact of rating on price (the vendor learning) as well as the impact 
of price on rating (the consumer learning) are all through demand.   
============Insert Figure here============ 
Fig 5 Double-Learning Results: Full Demand-Mediation Relationship 
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Table 6     Result of LIML Estimation of Double Learning Model 
 Vender Learning Demand Function Consumer Learning 
 (Log Price t) (Log SalesRank t-1) (Avgrating  t) 
Log SalesRank t-1 -0.0095  -0.0417 
 (-35.85, <.0001***)  (-62.6, <.0001***) 
Log SalesRank t-2  0.9268  
  (389.87, <.0001***)  
Log Price t-1 0.9939   
 (1076.74,  <.0001***)   
Log Price t-2 0.0139 -0.0016 
 (1.67, 0.0943*) (-0.70, 0.4867) 
Avgrating t-1  0.9434 
 
 
 (473.99, <.0001***) 
Avgrating t-2 0.0000 -0.0380  
 (0.05, 0.9622)# (-5.34, <.0001***)  
Log Popularity t-1 0.0013  0.0033 
 (2.80, 0.0051***)  (2.93, 0.0034***) 
Log Popularity t-2  0.0609  
  (14.9, <.0001*** )  
Log T t-1 -0.0010  0.0002 
 (-2.28, 0.0228**)  (0.21, 0.8326) 
Log T t-2  -0.0300  
  (-7.63, <.0001***)  
HelpRatio t-1 0.0050  0.0044 
 (1.42, 0.1547)  (0.49, 0.6230) 
HelpRatio t-2  -0.0573  
  (-1.8, 0.0717*)  
DVD Dummy -0.0024 -0.0519 -0.0059 
 (-2.26, 0.0236**) (-5.52, <.0001*** ) (-2.23, 0.0256) 
    
N 21918 21918 21918 
R2 0.98285 0.9191 0.9271 
Indirect Effect (-0.0380)*(-0.0095)=0.0004 
(Rating->Price) (1.3355*)  
Indirect Effect 0.0139*(-0.0417)=-0.0006 
(Price->Rating)  (-4.8937***) 
Note: # (t-value, p-value); * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
4 Implications, Limitations and Future Research 
As online reviews are becoming an increasingly important source of information for consumers purchase 
decisions, there is an urgent need to bring in the long-over-look vendor side learning into equation. It is 
timely and important to understand how consumers are making purchase decision, how vendors are 
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making price adjustment decision, and how consumers and vendors are learning from each other. 
Furthermore, it is vital to find out whether vendors are acquiring information from both public and private 
information channels to make pricing adjustment decision, what kind vendors are more likely to engage 
on private information acquisition activities, and based on what signals vendors are making price 
adjustment. This paper contributes to the emerging literature on online reviews by addressing these 
fundamental but largely neglected questions.   
In this study, we bring in the information acquisition theory from capital market and consider the 
distinctive public and private information channels in which product price and quality information can be 
gathered. We find evidences that vendors are actively acquiring private information channels to help them 
make the right price adjustment. Vendors selling the more popular items and the newly released item are 
more inspired to gather private information. Thus given the same magnitude of rating change, it is more 
likely for these types of vendors to adjust price with a bigger amount. For the more popular items and at 
the early stage of marketing, online consumer review market provides limit information for these vendors 
to make pricing decision. Thus, they turn to private channels to collect further information to help them 
make the appropriate pricing decision. However, we also document that even without the rating change, 
depending on the popularity and the age of an item, the price adjustment vendors made also vary. That 
variation is determined by the net effect of the precision of the public information before announcements, 
the amount of pre-announcement private information acquisition, and the price rigidity. Vendors might be 
able to utilize the above learning effects to predict future price change of their competitors, while 
consumers can forecast the price of the items they are interested. As a result, vendors and consumers can 
make better decisions on when to enter the market if at all.  
 Through sophisticate system equations, we are able to unveil the complicate simultaneous 
learning processes between consumer and vendor. Surprisingly we find that contrary to a common 
wisdom, online vendors do not respond directly to online reviews; however, the impact of online reviews 
is indirect through sales. Vendors do not respond to review change unless that review change does impact 
sales. On the other hand, consumers are smart and they do not respond directly to the pricing change 
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made by the vendor as well. In other words, when facing a decreasing online consumer reviews, vendors 
cannot simply change the price in the hope of getting better sales through receiving better reviews 
because lowering a product price will not enable a vendor to get better consumer reviews directly. 
However, eventually decreasing price does help because it brings in a different segment of customers.  
Putting consumers and vendors together, we document a full demand-mediation model between rating 
and price, which is there is no direct linkage between price and rating. The impact of rating on price (the 
vendor learning) as well as the impact of price on rating (the consumer learning) are all through demand. 
Two potential explanations might be able to account for the above observations: 1) the impact of 
reviews has been incorporated into sales; 2) Even with the fast adoption and increasingly importance of 
online reviews, pricing decision with or without the presence of online reviews maintains the same. 
Online reviews just provide another channel that vendors can utilize to understand their customers better 
and faster. The pricing is still simple driven by the relation between supply and demand.  Vendors will 
only adjust the price when they see a decreasing demand. The reason for that might originate from the 
trustworthy issue of online reviews. Online reviews might be manipulated because actual customers, 
online vendors themselves, online vendors’ competitors, publishers, and authors are all able to write 
“consumer” reviews. So vendors will not responds to online reviews change unless such a change is 
material and results in actionable consequence, the sales change (demand). So what are these vendors 
betting on? We believe the answer lies on the smartness of the consumers. As we show that the change on 
the product price has no direct impact on consumer rating either. Consumers are wise and their 
evaluations are not directly influenced by the change of product price. Furthermore, Dellarocas (2006) 
analytically shows even with manipulation, consumers are smart and can adjust their interpretation of 
online opinions accordingly. Putting all these together, vendors make the right decision by not simply 
responding to review change as well. They are waiting for consumers’ movement before making the final 
price adjustment.  
We believe that our findings have significance in practice. As more and more consumers turn to 
the Internet for product information, vendors turn to online channel for increasing sales. Online consumer 
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reviews have become a significant force to influence the purchase decision of consumers as well as the 
pricing decision of vendors. However, vendors should be educated to better manage online information 
channel so as to unveil the consumer’s personal assessment of product. Vendors should not try to 
manipulate the online reviews in the hope of gaining better sales. Online reviews are not silver bulletin, 
and not all online reviews are created equally. Vendors should not write fake online reviews blindly or 
adjust their pricing thoughtlessly. 
This research has certain limitations that warrant our attention as they offer new avenues for 
further research. First, the data set used for this research is slightly old. Although we believe this has no 
impact on our findings, future research can consider re-validating our research with newer data. Second, 
our study does not consider the intrinsic difference among various sub-product categories within Book or 
DVD category. For example, vendor should follow different price adjustment strategies based on whether 
the quality of their products is more subjective or objective. For items with more objective valuation, 
vendors should be very cautious about making pricing adjustment because 1) reviews for these objective 
items are relative stable; 2) even with the presence of some bad reviews posted by consumers or 
competitors, given the more objective nature of this type of goods, future customers will be less likely to 
be influenced by the bad reviews. And the later authentic consumer reviews will come in and correct such 
a bias.  Third, contrary to common wisdom, we were not able to document the direct relationship between 
the pricing and rating. We interpret this as rational behaviors taking by both vendors and consumers due 
to potential online manipulation. However, the picture might be much worse than what we just painted. 
Even though both vendors and consumers sit right across table, it seems that neither of them really listens 
to each other. To some degree they are totally blind to the other party and the messages sent right across 
the table are all considered as non-trustworthy. Somehow demand becomes a trusted agent because only 
the information flow through demand becomes dependable and actionable. Is this really driven by the 
manipulation behavior or this is driven by Amazon sample? Why do vendors ignore the rich meaning of 
these online reviews? Are vendors and consumers under-responding? Why do consumers not giving a 
better rating when the price decreases? Future research focusing on one specific subject topic of book or 
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DVD and utilizing datasets from different websites and at different time-periods may lead to more 
interesting findings in vendor learning. Before that happen, we leave the question to our readers, which 
side of the story do you believe, the double learning or double blinding?   
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